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THE INWARD TURN IN OUTSIDER JURISPRUDENCE
RICHARD DELGADO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, several areas of "outsider jurispru-
dence"1 have developed rapidly Radical feminism 2 has trans-
formed the way we view gender and inequality while achieving
concrete reforms in such areas as the workplace, 3 reproductive lib-
erty,4 and regulation of pornography.5 A newer movement, Critical
Race Theory (CRT), has attracted significant attention,6 although
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. J.D.,
University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, 1974.
1. On the origin of the term, see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
For an overview of the new jurisprudence, see Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider
Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause
of Law Reform?, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 847 (1991).
2. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY];
Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 1, at 849-50.
3. E.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (analyzing the legal questions posed when the law is used to
challenge the pattern and practice of sexual harassment).
4. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to abortion is
grounded in the constitutional right to privacy); SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL:
MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975) (reconstructing the history and evolution of rape, rape laws,
and the social perception of rape); SUSAN EsmicH, REAL RAPE (1987) (discussing the law's
treatment of "Simple," versus "Real," rape and the need to treat them similarly); Frances
E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1497 (1983) (arguing that the dichotomy between the marketplace and family limits
the effectiveness of reforms aimed at improving lives of women).
5. See generally Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449 (1992) (Canadian case holding that
the restrictions on freedom of expression caused by obscenity laws are justified by the
avoidance of harm to society); ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A- MACKINNON, PORNOGRA-
PHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988) (justifying laws against
pornography and proposing an ordinance against pornography).
6. A recent bibliography of principal works lists over 200 articles and books. See Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV.
461 (1993). The central tenets of Critical Race Theory have been praised-as well as con-
demned-in Harvard Law Review, the New York Times, and The Nation magazine. See
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it has yet to produce feminism's wide-rangmg reforms. This Article
discusses two developments that portend far-reaching changes ei-
ther in the structure of these emerging movements or in the way
they are perceived. The first consists of calls for standards for eval-
uating examples of outsider scholarship. What is good outsider
writing? How shall we appraise an article written entirely in the
narrative mode, for example, or putting forward a new cultural
analysis of race but citing only a handful of Supreme Court deci-
sions? Calls for evaluative standards often originate with persons
skeptical of the new scholarship." But sometimes they are put for-
ward by sympathizers and fellow travelers concerned with the well-
being and growth of such scholarship.9
The other development originates within the new movements
themselves. Sometimes called antiessentalism, ° this concept fo-
cuses on internal differentiation within the insurgent groups. It
raises such questions as whether the concerns of women of color
are capable of being addressed adequately within the women's
movement, or whether Hispanics and African Americans stand on
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989);
Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Law, a New Theory Holds, Has a White Voice, N.Y. TnMEs,
July 17, 1992, at A23; Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, NATION, Sept. 4, 1989, at 246,
246.
7. See infra notes 37-94, 118-32 and accompanying text. For a more general discussion of
the problem of evaluating legal scholarship, see, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure
and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065
(1991); Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REv. 221
(1988); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 1835 (1988); G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards, 60
Tax. L. REv. 569 (1982); see also Symposium, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes,
90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981); A Symposium on Legal Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 521
(1992).
8. See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text (discussing the role of Randall Kennedy,
Suzanna Sherry, Toni Massaro, and Mark Tushnet).
9. See infra notes 39-62 and accompanying text (discussing the role of Edward Rubin
and Mary Coombs).
10. For a lucid explanation of the concept, see Angela P Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 584-85 (1990) (arguing that gender essen-
tialism silences the voices of racial minorities within that gender). Essentialism is a belief
either that words have core meanings or essences (compare the "nominalist fallacy" in ana-
lytic philosophy), or that essential similarities exist among things in the world-for exam-
ple, chairs or women. See LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1967) (casting serious doubt on this latter notion).
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similar footings with respect to the struggle for racial equality 11
Are black Americans one group, or several?12 Although the two de-
velopments differ in significant ways, each can be seen as a type of
inward turn. In the call for standards, scholars m the academic
mainstream urge the adoption of universal criteria under which
outsider scholars will, m a sense, return to the fold-that is, agree
to be judged not by their own lights but those of the mainstream
academy 13 In the other development, outsider scholars subdivide
themselves, applying the method of critique to each other in hopes
of finding the essential atom of community-a group so like one-
self that unity and understanding will follow immediately 14 This
Article analyzes and compares these two trends.
Part II sets out what outsider scholarship is and explains in
greater detail the two "inward turns." Part III analyzes each turn
in an effort to determine what forces create the turn to explain its
emergence at this time. Part IV explores the consequences of both
turns for social reform. Should progressive readers welcome, or de-
plore, the call for standards and the process of successive subdivi-
sion that outsider groups are currently undergoing9
II. OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP AND THE INWARD TURN
A. Outsider Scholarship
Radical feminism and Critical Race Theory are in many respects
descendants of critical legal studies (CLS), a movement that
sprang up in the law in the early 1970s.15 Critical thought, tracea-
11. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text. These issues are in the forefront of
discussions among outsider groups. See, e.g., Final Program, 1992 Workshop on Critical
Race Theory (June, 1992) (listing topics for discussion).
12. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(1991) (discussing the division m the black community between supporters and opponents
of the contemporary civil rights movement).
13. In this sense, the turn is inward-from the perspective of those standing in the main-
stream. Inward and outward are, of course, matters of viewpoint and perspective.
14. See infra notes 95-117 and accompanying text. On the postmodern predicament and
its relation to the search for community, see ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEARM INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 152-62 (1985); Jean Stefancic,
The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of Meaning or Re-inscription of Hierar-
chy?, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 651 (1992).
15. See Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (providing an over-
view of the critical legal studies movement).
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ble to the work of continental theorists such as Heidegger, Gram-
sci, Foucault, and Marx, 16 entered the United States through the
disciplines of sociology, history, anthropology, and literature.
17 It
did not begin to affect law in any systematic way until the 1970s
when structuralism and deconstruction changed the way we under-
stood the interpretation of texts.18 Later, critical scholars intro-
duced indeterminacy and resumed the systematic examination of
power relations and the political agenda of law that the Realists
had begun several decades earlier.' 9
Critical legal studies heavily influenced a number of later move-
ments, including radical feminism and Critical Race Theory Both
borrowed from CLS its skepticism of law as science, 0 its question-
ing whether text contains one right meaning,21 and its distrust of
law's neutral and objective facade.22 Feminist legal scholars chal-
lenged law's deeply inscribed patriarchy, 3 showed that gender and
sex roles are constructed, not natural,24 and named and con-
16. On critical legal studies and its roots, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (1987); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV.
561 (1983).
17. See KELMAN, supra note 16, at 8-14; ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 5-24
(1975).
18. E.g., ART BERMAN, FROM THE NEW CRITICISM TO DECONSTRUCTION: THE RECEPTION OF
STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM (1988); STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
19. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (3d ed. 1960).
20. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 305-06 (1984).
21. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1984); Kelman, supra note 20, at 305.
22. E.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 205, 210 (1979) (discussing how law reflects the structure and values of Western capi-
talist thought).
23. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 147-67 (1987) (discussing society's regula-
tion of sex through law and how it reflects male dominance); DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra
note 5, at 11-22 (describing the historical inequality of women under the law and challeng-
ing the patriarchy in the context of pornography laws); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY,
supra note 2, at 157-234 (asserting that society's laws reinforce male power over women,
using as examples laws pertaining to rape, abortion, pornography, and gender discrimina-
tion); Olsen, supra note 4, at 1504-07 (arguing that the state's policy of "non-interference"
with the family actually validates preexisting societal roles which are disfavorable to women
and children).
24. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 149-51 (maintaining that male and female roles
in sexual intercourse are not natural, but are affected by societal rules and laws that seek to
preserve male dominance); DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 26-28 (describing how
society defines women as inferior and the role of that definition in pornography).
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demned such practices as sexual harassment in the workplace, 25
spousal abuse,2s and violent pornography 27 Both feminists and
Critical Race scholars have challenged law's dominant mode of de-
tached impartiality, offering in its place scholarship that is more
contextualized and based on narrative and experience. 28 They have
also sparked a renewed interest in pedagogy, exploring such issues
as whether the legal curriculum is biased and whether law school
teaching silences women and minorities.29
Critical Race Theory sprang up with the realization that the civil
rights movement of the 1960s had stalled and needed new ap-
proaches to deal with the complex relationship among race, racism,
and American law.30 Derrick Bell and others began writing about
liberalism's defects and the way our system of civil rights statutes
and case law reinforces white-over-black domination.3l Many writ-
25. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 3 (providing an overview of sexual harassment
in the workplace and arguing that it is a form of sex discrimination).
26. See id. at 160 (arguing that attempts to attain a legal response to the problem of
domestic violence have been ineffectual and noting that within a relationship with a sexual
dimension, such as marriage, "even acts that have been objectively illegal are systematically
tolerated"); see also ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE (1982) (telling the story of a black
woman's struggle with rape and abuse at the hands of her father and her husband).
27. E.g., DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 5.
28. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED] (using ten metaphorical ta-
les-Chronicles-to illustrate the state of race relations in the United States); Derrick Bell,
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REV.
4 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Chronicles]; Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (1990) (describing context as an ability to "recognize patterns
of differences" among people, thereby showing how supposedly neutral rules "burden or
exclude anyone who does not share the characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-
bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules were actually written").
29. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 93,
93-99 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 50 (1985) (discussing women's
role in the legal process and arguing that "even though our present legal structures may
reflect elements of both [male and female] sets of values, there is a tendency for the male-
dominated or male-created forms and values to control").
30. For a general description and history of the movement, see Delgado & Stefancic,
supra note 6; Goldberg, supra note 6.
31. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 524-27 (1980) (arguing that whites viewed the Brown deci-
sion and an end to segregation as favorable to their economic and political interests and that
this "convergence of black and white interests" has now faded, resulting in more recent
court cases that make integration of education as espoused in Brown more difficult to
achieve); Bell, Chronicles, supra note 28, at 11 (questioning why the Supreme Court heard
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ers within CRT believe that a major stumbling block to racial re-
form is the majoritarian mindset-the group of "truths," myths,
and received wisdoms that persons in the dominant group bring to
discussions about race.3 2 To analyze and displace these power-
laden myths, CRT writers employ parables, narratives, and
"counterstores." 3 Others explore racial separatism and national-
ism, questioning whether persons of color will ever obtain justice
through assimilation into white society34
Both ideologies-feminism and Critical Race Theory-have gen-
erated bibliographies, criticism and self-criticism, and special is-
sues of law reviews.3 5 Both are now self-conscious movements with
workshops, conferences, and newsletters."s
B. The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence
Both feminism and Critical Race Theory recently have under-
gone, or have been urged to undergo, two types of inward turn.
The first version is the call for standards; the second, the internal
no cases in its 1984 term involving major racial issues, despite the submission of 60 such
cases for review); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1050 (1978) (discussing how, in spite of the law's prohibition on racial discrimination, Su-
preme Court decisions have "affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their
children in all-black, poorly-funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and
have very little political power, without any violation of antidiscrimination law").
32. See, e.g., Bell, Chronicles, supra note 28, at 8-11 (noting the profound role of myths
in guiding racial policy, both historically and in contemporary society); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2411,
2413 (1989) (arguing that many minorities view their subordination in society as a product
of "the prevailing mind set by means of which members of the dominant group justify the
world as it is, with whites on top and browns and blacks at the bottom").
33. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 28; Bell, Chronicles, supra note 28; Del-
gado, supra note 32 (providing five different "stories" of a racial incident and analyzing how
each advances a different version of reality).
34. See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 28; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1366-68 (1992) (discussing double and false consciousness
and how people of color are affected by the culture and consciousness of the dominant
group).
35. E.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6; Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, A Bibliogra-
phy of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984); Symposium, supra note 15.
36. For a discussion of the origins and development of Critical Race Theory through a
series of small summer workshops held at secluded locations, see Delgado & Stefancic,
supra note 6.
OUTSIDER JURISPRUDENCE
splintering of the groups themselves. This section briefly describes
these developments. Part III then asks how we should view them.
1. The Call for Standards
The call for standards comes mainly from members of the aca-
demic mainstream . Typically, they point out that the new schol-
arship is nontraditional in tone and content and urge the promul-
gation of standards. Such standards will enable the academic
community to determine the quality of examples of the new work
and to make intelligent decisions regarding their authors' promo-
tion and tenure.38 These calls can be seen as a type of "inward
turn" in that they aim to bring outsider scholarship within the aca-
demic mainstream by placing it within an evaluative paradigm that
includes all authors, traditional and nontraditional alike. For pur-
poses of analysis, these calls fall into two groups-those that are
friendly to the newcomers, and those that are less so.
a. Friendly Calls for Standards
Two authors, Edward Rubin 9 and Mary Coombs,'0 are typical of
those members of the mainstream who write from positions of
sympathy They hold that we need new criteria so the new voices
will not be treated harshly by members of the academic main-
stream. Evaluation, Rubin points out, serves gatekeeping and adju-
dicating functions.41 It is an exercise of power42 as well as the
37. See infra notes 39-94 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments for standards
from authors sympathetic to outsider scholorship and those who are less sympathetic). To
my knowledge, no member of the Critical Race Theory movement has echoed this call for
standards.
38. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (describing how sympathetic proponents
believe standards will help ensure a fair evaluation process). It is worth noting that until the
advent of the new genres, tenure and promotion decisions were made under the most infor-
mal criteria imaginable. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (discussing the way
in which most law school personnel decisions are conducted in an atmosphere of subjectiv-
ity, with few guidelines or due process controls).
39. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80
CAL. L. REv. 889 (1992).
40. Mary Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLo. L. REV.
683 (1992).
41. Rubin, supra note 39, at 891. Evaluation "defines the boundaries" of an academic
discipline and governs debates within the discipline. Id.
42. -Id. at 893.
1993] 747
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means by which institutions define themselves.43 It distributes
prestige and determines whose ideas are considered valid and
whose are not.44 For these reasons, it is essential that evaluation
not reflect bias, idiosyncrasy, or personal disagreement with the
works and authors being evaluated. 45 A well-designed theory of
evaluation can induce evaluators to suspend the instinct to judge
too quickly and can encourage them to hold "in abeyance the views
on which one's lifework is based. '46 It can produce a fairer result
when a white is evaluating a black, a man a woman, or any time
when the evaluator and the scholar being evaluated are different in
attitude, background, or politcs.
47
According to Rubin, scholarship generally can be evaluated
under such universal criteria as clarity, persuasiveness, signifi-
cance, and applicability 48 With outsider scholarship, additional
criteria come into play, including the ability to produce doubt, dis-
sonance, and anxiety-the "purposive questioning of one's own be-
liefs. '49 Without some such broadening, the tendency to dismiss
work as impractical and intemperate is simply too great.50 But
with it, "judgment remains possible[ The evaluators] are not dis-
abled from making assessments about the quality of the work they
are reading. '5 1 Rubin's effort then is to provide for recognition of
differences, yet to subsume those differences under a new "univer-
sality of the evaluative enterprise. "52
Coombs' article sounds some of the same themes and adds at
least one new one. For Coombs, radical feminism and Critical Race
Theory are defined by commitment to the interests of people of
color and women, by rejection of abstraction and dispassionate 'ob-
jectivity,' ,,51 and by a preference for narrative and other new
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 894-97.
46. Id. at 897.
47. Id. at 894-902.
48. Id. at 962.
49. Id. at 946.
50. Id. at 949-50.
51. Id. at 961.
52. Id.
53. Coombs, supra note 40, at 684.
748 [Vol. 34:741
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modes of discourse and scholarship.54 These qualities are apt to
evoke unsympathetic responses from traditional scholars, who may
dismiss the new work entirely, fail to understand the scholarship
or grant it the "respect inherent in 'sustained criticism.' ,,55
The development of standards can quell some of these impulses .5
It can also benefit the communities themselves. The search for cri-
teria of judgment is a "means by which [such a community can]
understand [its] goals and improve [its] work.
' 57
In pursuit of these objectives, Coombs lays down criteria for
evaluating traditional legal scholarship that sound remarkably like
Rubin's: the work should be "coherent, well-reasoned, articulate
and precise." 58 The subject matter should appear to be distinctly
legal, "[tihe work analytic [and] tightly reasoned. '59 If the
work is expressly insurrectionist, further criteria would come into
play. Objectivity and dispassion would not be required;6 0 narra-
tives "and other non-analytic work" would be granted status equal
to that of more traditional products. 1 Transformative work would
be granted special praise.2
b. Unfriendly Calls for Evaluatwe Standards
Among those who call for the development of standards for judg-
ing outsider scholarship, but from a perspective less sympathetic
than that of Coombs or Rubin, the most notable are Randall
Kennedy and Suzanna Sherry
i. The Universalist Critique-Randall Kennedy
In a much-cited article in the Harvard Law Review, 3 Randall
Kennedy takes three central figures of the Critical Race Theory
54. Id. at 684-86.
55. Id. at 688 (quoting Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F 115,
116).
56. Id. at 703.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 706.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 713.
61. Id. at 714-15.
62. Id. at 715.
63. Kennedy, supra note 6.
1993] 749
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movement" to task for asserting the existence of a distinctive
black (or brown) "voice,"65 elevating race to a positive credential,66
substituting myth and narrative fiction for reality,6" and "milita-
rizing" the debate about race and equality 6
8
For Kennedy, many of these defects stem from the same source:
substituting for merit the perspective or experience of an author
"as a mark of achieved distinction. 6 In his opinion, race-con-
scious scholarship should not demand recognition or special valid-
ity merely on account of its authorship, subject, or style. Rather, it
should do so by virtue of satisfying universal, agreed-upon stan-
dards of scholarly excellence.7 0 The writing must not be intemper-
ate or grandiose, its claims must be validated, its metaphors care-
fully chosen.7 1 Above all, the writer must be circumspect. A
statistical disparity in the number of law professors of color, for
example, is always open to more than one interpretation. The sys-
tem may be racist, or there may be something about professors of
color or the pool from which they are drawn that explains the dis-
parity.72 Kennedy, then, urges that we evaluate critical scholarship,
but under present-day, agreed-upon scholarly standards. He ap-
plies those standards to the work of Matsuda, Bell, and this au-
thor-and by implication to the work of other members of the
school-and finds it wanting.7
3
ii. The Counternarratwity Critique: Massaro,
Tushnet, and Sherry
Randall Kennedy's voice is the starkest of those calling attention
to the manner in which the new scholarship should be judged.
Three additional authors address the evaluation of outsider schol-
arship, but from a narrower and sometimes less hostile perspective.
64. The figures are Derrick Bell, Man Matsuda, and this author. Id. at 1746.
65. Id. at 1778-87.
66. Id. at 1770-78, 1788-1807.
67. Id. at 1760-70.
68. Id. at 1807-10, 1815-16.
69. Id. at 1805.
70. Id. at 1771-74, 1805.
71. Id. at 1760-70, 1771-78, 1805.
72. Id. at 1762-70.
73. Id. at 1760-87, 1810-19.
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Suzanna Sherry, 4 Toni Massaro, 5 and Mark Tushnet 8 focus on
how we should assess one type of scholarship associated with femi-
nist and CRT writing, namely narrative scholarship. This form of
scholarship, which includes chronicles, parables, counterstories,
and accounts of the writer's personal experiences," poses a sharp
challenge to normative orthodoxy Narrative works often advance
no argument (at least of a classical, linear sort)," cite few cases or
authorities79 other than the author's own experience, 0 offer no bal-
anced assessment of different "models" or approaches to a legal
question."' Typically, they aim not at changing doctrine but at
changing mindset-the bundle of perceptions, intuitions, and re-
ceived wisdoms that all of us bring to our experiences and that
constitute the background against which legal discourse is carried
out. 2
Can we evaluate narrative scholarship, and if so, how9 Each of
the scholars has his or her doubts. Toni Massaro, writing in the
Michigan Law Review Symposium on Legal Storytelling, ques-
tions what she considers to be narrative scholarship's principal
claim-that it can increase empathy between the reader and the
author.8 3 How can anyone measure this increase in empathy9 And,
with whom ought one empathize? Most "Crits" and feminists write
as though the answer is obvious-the reader should empathize
with the perspectives of women and people of color. But why with
74. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); see Goldberg, supra note 6, at A23 (noting Sherry's
criticism of Critical Race Theory).
75. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989).
76. Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
77. For examples of narrative scholarship, see BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note
28; DWORKIN, supra note 23; Bell, Chronicles, supra note 28; Delgado, supra note 32;
Delgado, supra note 54; Guimer, supra note 29; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29; see also
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (detailing the author's ex-
periences as a black female attorney and law professor).
78. E.g., Delgado, supra note 32, at 2411-12.
79. E.g., id.
80. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 77.
81. Delgado, supra note 32, at 2411-13.
82. Id. at 2413; see also Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 COR-
NELL L. REV. 813 (1992) (holding that this level is even more causally efficacious than
doctrine).
83. Massaro, supra note 75, at 2100-01, 2116-25.
1993]
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just these, and not with munitions makers, strip-miners, or lexicog-
raphers? Empathy's indeterminacy renders its use as a criterion of
merit problematic. 4 Moreover, experiential writing's emphasis on
particularity seems inconsistent with the uniformity demanded by
the rule of law. 5 Why should we give high marks to writing that
requires us to sacrifice a principal tenet of our professional lives?
Massaro holds that narrative scholarship can nevertheless serve
the more modest function of strengthening the communitarian im-
pulse, reminding us to suspend our tendency "to treat people like
ourselves better than those outside our spheres of familiarity "86
Yet, it must also be realistic and hard-headed, allowing us to draw
lines among those who would claim our sympathies. While circular
or "dialogic" in structure, narrative scholarship needs to draw lines
"around the circles to end [or] decide a legal matter. ' '87 Fi-
nally, narrativity must take into account the here and now and
deal with existing social and legal institutions rather than rest con-
tent with describing utopian alternatives.8 8 Evaluated with these
provisos in mind, narrative scholarship may provide a useful cor-
rective or "counsel[] against complacency "89
Two more recent writers are less charitable toward narrative
scholarship and less sanguine about finding ways to bring it within
the evaluative paradigm. In a recent article, Mark Tushnet argues
that not all narrative writing deserves the adulation that it has re-
ceived; that much of it is sloppy and impressionistic; and that
some of it lacks candor and authenticity 90 A second writer,
Suzanna Sherry, is also dubious of narrative scholarship, particu-
larly as employed by certain Critical Race theorists who assert it as
a crowning accomplishment and a virtual badge of membership. 1
Unlike feminism, in which Carol Gilligan provides a rationale and
84. Id. at 2116-25.
85. Id. at 2102-03, 2110-11.
86. Id. at 2123.
87. Id. at 2125.
88. Id. at 2122-26.
89. Id. at 2126.
90. See Tushnet, supra note 76, at 260-77, 295 (discussing stylistic flaws in certain mflu-
ential narratives which undermine the format's effectiveness as legal scholarship).
91. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at A23.
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theory for the different nature of the women's voice,9 2 there is no
showing that scholars of color have any such common, distinct
voice." Some African Americans are conservative, some radical;
some are comfortable members of the middle class, others live in
the ghetto. To expect that such a diverse group would speak in a
single voice or subscribe to a common set of narratives is simply a
mistake.9 4 Narrative scholarship by blacks should thus be evalu-
ated on its own terms and afforded no greater status or presump-
tion of authenticity than that written by a white scholar intended,
for example, to illuminate the Rule Against Perpetuities. I evaluate
this and other arguments against the new scholarship shortly.
2. The Inward Turn in Outsider Scholarship
A second form of inward turn is taking place within outsider ju-
risprudence. This development consists of subdivision within out-
sider groups that at one time saw themselves as unitary Within
feminism, for example, women of color are beginning to question
whether the agenda of a white, middle-class-dominated woman's
movement speaks adequately to their concerns.95 Gays and lesbi-
ans of color are demanding recognition of their unique needs and
experiences, as are black women vis-A-vis black men.96 Recent con-
ferences have focused on "intersectionality"-the way in which
race, sex, class, and sexual orientation combine.9 Commentators
have even questioned the stability of these categorizations them-
selves, asking whether there is such a thing as a characteristic
black, straight, or female point of view.98 As one can imagine, these
92. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (describing the bases for the general
perspective of women in contrast to other groups).
93. Goldberg, supra note 6, at A23 (noting Sherry's argument that "the assertion of a
separate minority voice is dubious").
94. Id.
95. Harris, supra note 10, at 585-86.
96. See BELL HoOKs, AIN'T I A WOMAN? (1981); AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Sex, and Class,
Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER 114, 120 (1984); Marlon Riggs, Tongues
Untied (PBS television documentary, July 19, 1991).
97. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
98. CARTER, supra note 12, at 1-8; HOOKS, supra note 96, at 159-96; LORDE, supra note 96,
at 114, 116-23; Harris, supra note 10, at 583-85, 588-89, 595-97; Riggs, supra note 96; see
THIS BRIDGE CALLED My BACK: WRITINGS By RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 61-101 (Cherrie
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 2d ed. 1983) (containing writings that emphasize the dis-
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developments have proven controversial. Three scholars with rela-
tively polar positions illustrate the range of possibilities.
a. Advocating Differentiation: Angela Harris and
KimberlM Crenshaw
Illustrative of the differentiation ("antiessentialist") position are
two black women, Angela Harris of UC-Berkeley, 99 and Kimberl6
Crenshaw of UCLA.100 Both write about the relationship between
women of color and women in the broader feminist mainstream,
although many of the arguments they raise reappear in exchanges
between straight and gay reformers, working- and professional-
class minorities, neoconservative and movement blacks, and so on.
A principal theme for both writers is relative disempowerment.
Harris writes of the way in which white feminists, although "pow-
erful and brilliant in many ways, rel[y] on gender essential-
ism" 10 1-the idea that women's experiences can be captured m
general terms, without regard to such differentiating features as
race or class.102 This approach marginalizes and silences those
within the group who are different from the norm.103 Harris argues
that creating and addressing the situation of such an "essential wo-
man" tends to leave out black, working-class, and gay women.104
Feminist legal theory of the sort that Harris and Crenshaw criti-
cize not only marginalizes, it is ineffective in creating a more just
society It falls prey to the abstraction trap when feminist method-
ology should emphasize particularity; it verges on violence; and it
tinct identities of black women as compared to black men, and black feminists as compared
to white feminists).
99. See generally Harris, supra note 10 (arguing that gender essentialism omits the
viewpoints of minority women).
100. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and An-
tiractst Politics, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F 139 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws make pro-
visions only for discrimination pertaining to individual minority characteristics and there-
fore cannot recognize the peculiar plight of a minority woman).
101. Harris, supra note 10, at 585.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 589.
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promotes hierarchy and silencing, the very evils feminist theory
should seek to subvert.
10 5
Crenshaw echoes many of these points, but adds .the additional
dimension of racial essentialism. Focusing, like Harris, on the
plight of black women, Crenshaw notes that women of color are
uniquely disadvantaged under current antidiscrimination law.106
When a black woman experiences job discrimination on account of
her black womanhood, current doctrine provides two avenues of
recourse. The plaintiff may designate her claim as one for sexu-
al discrimination, in which case she is lumped into a cate-
gory-women-dominated by" white women.' 07 Or, she can sue for
discrimination on grounds of race, in which event she places her-
self in a remedial category dominated by black men.'08 Thus, she is
treated as though she were either a white woman or a black man,
even though she is less powerful than either.'0 9 Crenshaw's analysis
demonstrates how essentialist thinking disadvantages those who
are at the margins of any group. Although Harris argues that "is-
sues of race, class, and sexual orientation can[not] be safely
ignored," 10 Crenshaw illustrates concretely why this is so.
b. Opposing Differentiation: Martha Fineman
Harris' principal opponent in the essentialism debate has been
Martha Fineman."' She takes Harris and other antiessentialists to
task for their excessive preoccupation with differences and for con-
tributing to a "disunity" that impedes women's ability "to push
back the barriers excluding most of [them] and [their] ex-
periences.""' 2
Not only does this focus weaken the group's voice, argues
Fineman, it threatens to reduce the sum of power it wields: "The
competition should not be with each other but with the pow-
105. See id. at 585-86; Crenshaw, supra note 100, at 139-40.
106. Crenshaw, supra note 100, at 140.
107. Id. at 141-46.
108. Id. at 146-48.
109. Id. at 150-52.
110. Harris, supra note 10, at 591-92.
111. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. RE.v. 25, 39-41 (1990).
112. Id. at 40.
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erful, dominant main structures whose visions and versions of real-
ity are reflected in society's institutions.11 13 For Fineman, "femi-
nists of all races, classes, characteristics, and orientations
[must] find common ground" in their struggle against male tyr-
anny 11" Emphasizing minute differences among the experiences of
different groups-old/young, white/black, gay/straight-verges on
self-indulgence because it reinforces "the idea that the individual
is the agent of social action and change" 115 and results in token-
ism."'16 Fineman concludes that "focusing on the differences among
women, while of theoretical significance, can and will be used polit-
ically to continue to justify exclusion."" 7
III. EXPLAINING AND EVALUATING THE INWARD
TURNS IN OUTSIDER JURISPRUDENCE: POWER
MOVES AND PARADIGM FEAR
How are we to see the two inward turns9 To this point, I have
been concerned with explaining and placing in context the call for
standards and the antiessentialist movement. Moving beyond
description, this section attempts to understand and evaluate the
twin developments-to learn what drives them and what they har-
bor for -the cause of social reform.
A. Understanding the Two Developments
I think both developments are linked, and can be understood as
responses to power shifts or the prospect of paradigm change.
1. The Call for Standards
a. Power Moves and Countermoves
One way of understanding both the call for standards and inter-
nal fractioning within radical groups is in .terms of power shifts.
Power has been shifting both globally and within the United
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 41.
116. Id. at 42.
117. Id. at 43.
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States;"' old regimes are fading, hegemonies thought invulnerable
showing signs of strain."9 The same is true in the law and legal
scholarship, as law schools and the legal profession adapt and ac-
commodate to new constituencies and voices in a cycle of change
that promises to continue well into the future.
20
I believe the call for standards, at one level, is a response to the
need to share power and influence. Outsider scholars have been
writing-often provocatively and brilliantly-but with subject
matters, styles, formats, and agendas different from those of con-
ventional scholars. Mainstream writers may well ask themselves:
How shall we see this writing9 Will I have to welcome its authors
into the academy on an equal basis with me and my friends? Will I
myself have to change? Will I need to read and absorb a whole
host of obscure European authors or learn a new way of writing9
These prospects discomfit-they threaten to inconvenience indi-
viduals who have made a satisfactory adjustment to the existing
regime.' 2' To be sure, some mainstream writers have welcomed the
new voices and have included them in their own scholarship as
coequals. 22 Others have not. 23 An intermediate group, exemplified
by Randall Kennedy, takes the new entrants seriously, but de-
mands that they be judged according to prevailing standards.
24
This group demands that the new voices assimilate-in some re-
spects the most basic power move of all.
Rubin's and Coombs' versions of the call for standards are
milder, but still, in my view, animated by power concerns. Rubin
fears his colleagues will misapply power to injure the prospects of
118. See Delgado, supra note 34, at 1366-74, app. A at 1381.
119. Id. at 1366-74, app. A at 1381-83, app. B at 1383.
120. Id. at 1365-67; see Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 1, at 853-57; Kimberl6 W.
Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 1, 12-14 (1989).
121. See Pierre Schlag, Pre-Figuration and Evaluation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 965, 971, 977
(1992).
122. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited. How To Marginalize Out-
sider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1360-61 (1992) (mentioning
Kenneth Karst and Alan Freeman, among others, as examples of authors who treat outsider
scholarship thoughtfully and appropriately).
123. Id. at 1358-60, 1362-68 (citing numerous civil rights scholars and their various meth-
ods of treating outsider scholarship in a dismissive or cursory fashion).
124. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1771-74, 1805; see supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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outsider scholars. 12 5 To temper the impulse to judge harshly,
Rubin offers criteria that scholars must consider when evaluating
outsider writing. 2 ' His approach at least gives the newcomers the
security that mainstream power will not be applied against them
arbitrarily, but it still places the power to judge in those who al-
ready have that power.
12 7
Coombs' version is also aimed at curbing arbitrary power. She
wishes to "insulate" outsider scholarship from unsympathetic
treatment.'28 At times, Coombs seems to urge that outsiders should
play a part in deciding what the revised evaluation criteria should
be, 29 yet she retreats from this position by proffering her own set
of standards. 30 Furthermore, like Rubin, she makes clear which
outsider authors and works deserve praise.' 3 ' Both authors, then,
although more solicitous of the new movements than Kennedy,
strike me as unwilling simply to let them be. Both are prepared to
apply "outside" judgment to the movements-judgment that will
sometimes fall harshly on the authors and works concerned.
32
b. Anxiety over Paradigm Changes
A second reason why writers may be calling for renewed atten-
tion to evaluation of faculty scholarship is anxiety over the chang-
ing scholarly paradigm. 13 3 This paradigm has been in rapid transi-
125. Rubin, supra note 39, at 893-99.
126. Id. at 891, 962-63.
127. Id. at 892-93, 962-63.
128. Coombs, supra note 40, at 703, 709.
129. Id. at 710.
130. Id. at 712-15 (stating that the standards of judgment should take into account the
work's suitability for its chosen audience, the work's ability to advance the interests of the
outsider community, the narrative and personalized style of the work, and the clarity, origi-
nality, and ambition of the work).
131. Id. at 712 (citing several authors that deserve "high marks" for transforming the way
people think about law and legal culture); see also Rubin, supra note 39, at 954-61 (discuss-
ing various works of critical legal scholarship).
132. The consequences include: nonhiring, nonpromotion, and nontenure, as well as a
host of less serious consequences of a negative evaluation, such as failure to be included in a
conference or panel. See infra notes 145, 171-73 and accompanying text.
133. Schlag, supra note 121, at 972, 974, 977. For further discussion of the dominant par-
adigm and its role in resisting transformative thought, see Delgado, supra note 34 (discuss-
ing Northern European thought and its rise and possible impending decline because of the
dominant group's general resistance to change); Delgado, supra note 32 (discussing the
dominant group and its members' view that its own superior position is natural, its refusal
758 [Vol. 34:741
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tion over the past decade.13 4 Nearly gone is the 100-page densely
footnoted, case-crunching article of the 1950s and early 1960s, re-
placed by a host of new forms. 135 Scholars are writing about story-
telling in the law, employing or analyzing "voice" and narrative,
treating law as stories and trials as theater. 36 Feminists are writing
about changing the terms of discourse, putting women at the
center.31 Even mainstream scholars are beginning to move beyond
doctrinal analysis to political theory, interdisciplinary studies, and
legal history 138
Sociologists of knowledge have discussed the tendency of the
dominant group in a discipline to resist change as long as possi-
ble. 39 It seems likely that the new focus on evaluation is in part a
response to legal scholarship's unsettled condition. "40 The new
genres place in question much that was taken for granted-indeed,
to recognize its oppressive role, and its resistance to racial reform by refusing to listen to
nondominant views).
134. Schlag, supra note 121, at 977; see Delgado, supra note 34, at 1365-68.
135. See Delgado, supra note 122; Delgado, supra note 34; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The
New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Schlag, supra note 121.
136. See Delgado, supra note 32, at 2411-16. See generally Symposium, Excluded Voices:
Realities in Law and Law Reform, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Symposium,
Excluded Voices] (containing nontraditional legal scholarship on reforming law through
demonstrating differences in opinion and language); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (containing articles by Milner S. Ball, Derrick Bell, Mari J. Mat-
suda, Steven L. Winter, and others on the use of stories and narratives to disrupt the domi-
nant paradigm).
137. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2 (asserting that for women
to live in society, there is a need for change and unqualified feminism); Symposium, Ex-
cluded Voices, supra note 136 (containing articles by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Isabel
Marcus, Kristen Bumiller, and others on the female position in society and the feminist
attempt to reform the law).
138. My own brief (and admittedly unsystematic) perusal of a selection of recent top-tier
law reviews disclosed no articles of the doctrinal case-analysis genre. Fully half dealt with
political theory, philosophy of law, interdisciplinary analysis, or legal history.
139. E.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (ob-
serving that most new scientific theories and equations were and are always resisted because
they reconstruct prior theory and force reevaluation of prior fact, thereby undermining past
efforts); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Re-
form, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 216-22
(1989) (stating that the current legal system facilitates self-replicating traditional legal
thought and constrains novel approaches to the law).
140. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 39, at 889-91 (discussing the importance of developing
evaluation criteria to address new areas of scholarship such as critical legal scholarship and
the field of law and economics).
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put in doubt whether there is any such single, unitary field as legal
scholarship. 4 ' By promulgating uniform standards of evaluation,
we may enable ourselves to believe a little longer that such a set-
tled, manageable, and familiar notion of legal scholarship exists.
For example, Kennedy emphasizes the continuity of race-critical
scholarship with earlier writing in the black tradition. 42 Critical
Race scholarship is not so new, he seems to be saying; we can lay it
side by side with a masterwork by W.E.B. DuBois and decide
whether it has the same degree of merit. 43 When we do, the stan-
dards will be the familiar ones of rhetorical excellence, attention to
detail, originality, and documentation of claims.'4
Coombs and Rubin also betray traces of paradigm anxiety
Coombs, for example, writes of the "somewhat hostile" relation-
ship the oppositionists settled into with the scholarly establish-
ment and of the resulting risks of misperception on both sides. 45
Given this charged atmosphere, "[t]he work of feminist and critical
race scholars will often fail to meet the existing, under-articu-
lated standards, especially insofar as they are a test of familiarity
[Much of] [t]his scholarship has different goals, different forms,
different audiences" from what came before. 14 It thus behooves us
to find ways to incorporate it under new criteria of broad applica-
bility '17 And, as we have seen, Coombs' criteria seem designed, in
part, to reduce the apparent distance between mainstream and in-
surgent work.
48
2. The Inward Turn Within Outsider Groups
Subdivision among outsider groups, in which members of various
ages, colors, sexes, socioeconomic strata, and sexual orientations
141. See Johnson, supra note 135, at 2020; Schlag, supra note 121, at 971-77. See gener-
ally Stefancic, supra note 14 (discussing the felt need for symposia to impose order, agree-
ment, and communities of meaning on the shifting and changing nature of legal
scholarship).
142. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1749-60.
143. See id. at 1783 n.173.
144. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
145. Coombs, supra note 40, at 688.
146. Id. at 707.
147. Id. at 707-08. Coombs states, "The misapplication of inappropriate, vague criteria to
the work of outsider scholars creates problems " Id. at 708.
148. See supra notes 55-62, 145-46 and accompanying text.
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split off,' 49 may also be seen as a response to power. Like black
women who are asserting their differences vis-a-vis white women
and black men, many of these other groups may be doing so out of
a felt need for security and solidarity Life in the larger group can
be frustrating. One feels disempowered, sometimes ignored. The
agenda is not what one would wish.150 Moreover, the response from
the larger group may be couched in not-so-veiled power terms: re-
main with us; only here will you find safety from our common
oppressor.151
In so appealing to Harris-and through her to other black
women-Martha Fineman avoids what I might call "first genera-
tion," or ordinary essentialism. That is, she avoids asserting that
all women share a unitary, indivisible nature or essence. Rather,
she invokes a more subtle form, which I call "relational" (or sec-
ond-generation) essentialism. This variety asserts that A and B, al-
though perhaps not exactly alike in every respect, nevertheless
stand on the same footing vis-A-vis C, usually a common enemy of
some sort. Thus, when Fineman calls for black women to put aside
their differences with white women in the interest of presenting a
united front against patriarchy and male domination, 152 she in-
vokes relational essentialism. Vis-A-vis those evils, all women are
similarly situated, standing essentially in the same place.153
Harris' answer, of course, replicates Fineman's argument back to
her: true, but a white woman like you looks empowered to
me-likely to erase my identity, likely to neglect or suppress me in
much the same manner as males threaten both of us. 5 4 The argu-
ment could, of course, continue indefinitely One could imagine
Angela Harris confronting a lesbian custodial worker or a disabled
black professional and finding the same arguments used against
her. The cycle of differentiation-what I have called the "inward
turn"-continues potentially endlessly The search is for safety, for
a group of persons who are so much like oneself that there can be
149. See supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text for a description of this trend.
150. E.g., Harris, supra note 10, at 585, 588-90, 593.
151. See Fineman, supra note 111, at 40-42.
152. Id.
153. That is, both black and white women have a united interest in combatting the forces
of patriarchy and male domination.
154. Harris, supra note 10, at 585, 588-89, 609-10.
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no possible threat, among whom one may act and feel oneself. Par-
ticularly in troubled times we want a twin-someone who will be
like us, who will share power with and never hurt us. Such an indi-
vidual will understand us empathically and immediately, will never
ignore or power-trip us, will never undergo a paradigm shift that
we do not go through at the same time. With such a person we will
have complete safety and understanding-or such is the hope.
B. Evaluating the Two Developments
1. Internal Subdivision
I believe that the second type of inward turn-subdivision
within outsider groups-is natural and not to be feared or resisted.
The first type, however-the call for uniform standards of scholar-
ship-is more problematic.
Critique, especially on the part of outsider groups, is useful and
natural. 155 It aims to understand knowledge/power. 156 Because one
experiences knowledge and power even with one's coreligionists,
one eventually will apply critique to one's situation within the
movement. The end result is likely to be a complex vision of reality
in which the same person looks empowered to some and dis-
empowered to others in a nontransitive chain extending in as many
directions as there are possible axes of power and influence. None
of this, in my opinion, is to be deplored.
2. Calls for Evaluative Criteria
The other response-the call for standards-is different. It
threatens to impose an artificial similarity, to paper over and con-
ceal differences that are real. It promises fairness. 57 But its appeal
fades upon the realization that dissimilarities will remain even af-
ter new standards are in place. Knowledge, power, and validity will
155. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 1855 (1990); see also Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Recon-
structive Theology of Dr Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (suggesting
changes for the approach of critical legal scholars).
156. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 155; Cook, supra note 155. See generally MICHEL Fou-
CAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS (1980) (examining
each of the author's theories on the nature of power in society).
157. See supra part II.B.1.a.
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be bestowed and denied just as before, only now we will tell our-
selves that those we judged received "due process."
Because majority scholars are likely to greet the call for stan-
dards enthusiastically, I devote particular attention to why I find it
troublesome. First is what I call the incommensurability problem,
which casts doubt on the possibility of meaningful standards for
oppositional scholarship. Second, the judgment required for mak-
ing evaluations under the new standards will prove almost impossi-
ble. And third, academic settings are likely to resist the sort of due
process such standards hope to achieve.
a. The Incommensurability Problem
Evaluation entails taming something-reducing it to its essen-
tials.""8 It means developing a yardstick, submitting scholarship to
some form of measure. It has overtones of formalism, the notion
that law can be precise-a science-and that every legal question
has one right answer.15 Most of the new writers question this pre-
mise. For them, truth is contingent and contextual: what appears
orderly, fair, and neutral to a man looks patriarchal, unfair, an ex-
ercise of power to a woman.16 0 A rule or institution that seems un-
problematic to a white may seem deeply racist to a black,1 6 ' and so
on. The new writers reject the ideals of uniformity, objectivity, ne-
cessity, -and order. One might nevertheless hold that a body of
writing that disavows yardsticks ought to be evaluated anyway,
and in the same way as traditional scholarship. But incommensu-
rability between the enterprise-measuring-and the thing mea-
sured should give us pause.
158. See Schlag, supra note 121, at 976-77 (arguing that the evaluation frenzy is a reac-
tion to the untamed quality of recent scholarship). On the pitfalls of normative judgment,
see generally Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991) (con-
taining articles by Schlag, Winter, Schauer, and this author).
159. For a discussion of formalism, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). On the critique of formalism and its current parallel,
normativity, see Symposium, supra note 158.
160. See, e.g., MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2, at 32-45.
161. See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 28, at 51-74, 88-92, 102-07.
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b. The Judgment Problem
A second reason for caution stems from the gap between those
who will be doing the evaluating-mainstream scholars, tenure
committees, and so on-and those who will be put under the mi-
croscope. As with many expression-based tasks, evaluating outsider
scholarship will require an act of identification, of suspension of
judgment. Recent works cast doubt on how successfully we can do
this;1 2 indeed, Jean Stefancic and I have labeled the belief that we
can surmount our own limitations of experience and perspective
the empathic fallacy 163 Inevitably, those charged with making
judgments will evaluate new stories in terms of the old and in
terms of scholarship that makes sense to them and is relied upon
by them to construct and order reality If new perspectives deviate
too markedly from the old, the arbiters will pronounce them ex-
treme, irresponsible, political, or bad.16
4
Laying down checklists can be seen as our effort to force our-
selves to take outsiders seriously It is like those lists of tasks that
we make when we really want to get something done but fear we
might become distracted and forget. Yet, we all know how resolve
can vanish in the face of an unforeseen or tempting intrusion. Lists
and criteria help only so far. Like words generally, they are issued
against a background of values, interpretations, and unstated
presuppositions that guide and influence decisions at least as much
as the guidelines themselves.16 5 For example, uniform sentencing
rules, enacted with the hope of closing the race-based gap in sen-
162. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
1258, 1284-91 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images]; Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REv.
1929 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives].
163. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 162, at 1281.
164. See id. at 1279; Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 162, at
1952-57.
165. For similar arguments, see Delgado, supra note 82, at 814-21; Delgado, supra note
32, at 2411-18, 2435-41; see also Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 162, at 1275-84
(explaining that racial and ethnic prejudices and preconceptions permeate speech and cul-
ture); Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 162, at 1929-52 (detailing the
impact of prejudicial social values and norms upon judicial decisions).
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tencing, mainly produced uniformly harsh treatment for blacks."' 6
There is little reason to think evaluation of insurgent scholarship
will prove much different.
c. The Setting in Which Judgments Would Be Made
A final concern over uniform standards regards the setting in
which evaluation would take place. All speech-acts are paradigm-
dependent; that is why communication is possible.16 7 And, evalua-
tion is one of the most paradigm-dependent activities. 8 Unfortu-
nately, in the academic setting, arbitrariness and bias are inscribed
even more deeply than in the culture at large; I get to judge my
colleague's paper without having to defend my judgment. 9 We
even give this an honorific title-academic freedom.
In a few settings, such as adjudication, where there is a preexist-
ing norm of fairness, adopting formal rules and procedures can
sometimes reduce the worst types of bias and prejudice.17 0 In
academia, however, no such norm exists. Formal criteria are likely
to do little good and may well serve to legitimate an unfair and
biased system.
17 1
166. See David Margolick, Justice by the Numbers: A Special Report; Full Spectrum of
Judicial Critics Assail Prison Sentencing Guides, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at 1.
167. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 162, at 1280 (noting that speech
and the ideas it represents are not external but actual internal reflections of society); Steven
L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963
(1991) (arguing that communication requires shared internal views or models of the world
between the communicants).
168. That is, normative judgments are not easily dislodged by pointing out extrinsic rea-
sons for holding them false, as judgments m physics are, for example. See Delgado &
Stefancic, Images, supra note 162, at 1281. On the view that even opinion in the physical
sciences changes slowly and resists new theories, see KUHN, supra note 139.
169. Confidentiality, informal "old boy" networks, and the difficulty of obtaining judicial
review are some of the main mechanisms.
170. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1367-75. For the view
that even adjudication sometimes resists this approach, see Richard Delgadv, ADR and the
Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformalization Movement, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
145, 149-54 (1988).
171. For a discussion of the way in which formal rules may conceal unfairness, see Free-
man, supra note 31.
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d. Instrumental Reasons for Introducing Evaluative Criteria
Even if there are reasons to doubt that introducing criteria for
outsider scholarship will assure complete fairness, one might nev-
ertheless argue that the effort should be made to do so. Outsider
scholars are currently at risk of harsh treatment. Is not anything
better than the current unbridled discretion; would not any crite-
ria at least focus attention on the need for fairness?
I question whether this is so. As mentioned earlier, it seems
more likely that criteria will merely introduce uniformly bad treat-
ment for outsiders. 172 Further, the very idea of criteria for outsid-
ers has a disconcertingly assimilationist ring. Outsiders will be ex-
pected to meet these criteria; mainstream scholars will not be
expected to do anything different.173 We, not they, will be the ones
who will have to assimilate.
Finally, there is the curious timing, especially with regard to
Critical Race Theory, a movement that sprang up only a few years
ago. 1 4 Still in its infancy, CRT boasts only about two hundred ar-
tiles and four or five books.175 Yet, a number of authors, including
ones on the moderate left, wish to rush to establish criteria to eval-
uate the scholarship. Why? It seems to me that there are many
things one might wish to do with an infant: get to know it; nurture
it; interact with it; see if it needs anything. But evaluate it-ask
how its teeth, hair, eyes, and brain measure up9 Why? It is too
early to do this, if it is ever a good idea. Evaluative criteria grow
out of an activity, rather than the other way around. Evaluation is
the wrong critical judgment. CRT should devote its effort to criti-
quing social institutions, legal doctrine, and the culture of ra-
cism-not itself or its own members.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
173. See supra notes 156-58, 165-66 and accompanying text. On the one-sidedness of
majoritarian legal principles generally, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 383-86 (1991); Freeman,
supra note 31, at 1052-57; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 123-25 (1974).
174. As a self-conscious movement, Critical Race Theory came into existence through a
summer, 1989 workshop held in a small seminary outside Madison, Wisconsin.




For these reasons, the search for fair criteria is likely to prove
vain.176 Criteria will provide little protection while concealing bias,
making the system appear more legitimate than it is.
177
What, then, should we do9 One option is to do nothing. There is
little evidence that "race-Crits," at least, are suffering inordinately
under the current system. To be sure, the life of a professor of
color is often a lonely and stress-filled one, 1 7  but there is little
reason to think that minority professors contributing to Critical
Race Theory are faring worse than those who are not. Many of
them are publishing, some in the top journals,'179 and are expe-
riencing the enjoyment that comes with being at the forefront of a
social or legal movement.180 Rather than rushing in with a solution
to a problem that does not seem to be acute, there may be a case
for simply letting the kettle boil a little longer.' 8 '
If this situation were to change, other measures would assure the
safety of the new voices more effectively than rushing into place
criteria with which to judge them. We could, for example, empower
them-give them a voice strong enough that all could hear.18 2 We
could expose ourselves to them and hire and tenure them in suffi-
cient numbers to assure a critical mass.18 3 We could put them on
176. See supra text accompanying notes 158-71 (discussing theory-based reasons to avoid
evaluative standards); supra text accompanying notes 172-73 (discussing instrumental
reasons).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
178. See Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado
Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 355-59 (1989).
179. See Delgado, supra note 122, at 1350, 1352 n.15 (pointing out that feminist and CRT
authors have compiled outstanding publication records in the past five years).
180. For example, I am aware of two who are visiting at Columbia, one at N.Y.U., and one
at Texas. One recently visited at Harvard.
181. The situation may well be otherwise with other contemporary legal movements. See,
e.g., Coombs, supra note 40 (detailing the difficulties some feminist legal scholars are
facing).
182. For a similar suggestion, see Delgado, Images, supra note 162, at 1288-89 (suggesting
that expression is of little value for achieving rapid social transformation, but that empow-
ering outsiders' voices would be a start).
183. The term "critical mass" means a number sufficient to enable the newcomers to offer
each other psychological support and avoid being engulfed by demands such as tutoring and
counseling. For the view that most white-dominated law faculty will not tolerate such a
mass, see BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAvED, supra note 28, at 140-61 (chronicling the failure of
the "Seventh Candidate").
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tenure committees and invite them to judge traditional scholar-
ship. We could throw open for discussion the issue of how all
faculty scholarship, including ours, is to be judged-and give the
outsiders an equal voice in making this determination.
We could remain open to the idea that it is we who need to move
in their direction, that we should change our practice and thought
at least as much as they-and that doing so will redound to our
benefit. Paradigms-comfortable, familiar ways of doing things
-seldom change quickly and easily 84 But trying to deal with anx-
iety by promulgating universal standards entails real costs, places
these costs on those least able to incur them, and distances us from




184. See Schlag, supra note 121, at 971-77 (noting that calls for evaluation of faculty
scholarship are a response to denial, caused by a fear of paradigm change).
185. I argue elsewhere that this transformation can prove an inestimable benefit. See Del-
gado, supra note 34 (arguing through a fictional encounter with an exemplary future candi-
date for professorship that deserving, qualified minority candidates slip through the cracks
of criteria, thereby distancing their voices from the ears of students).
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